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the Security Council and the  
International Criminal Court: when 
Can the Security Council Defer a Case?
Ken Obura*
The first principle of the applicable law is this: that all discretionary powers of 
lawful decision making are necessarily derived from the law, and are therefore 
governed and qualified by the law…. It is not logically possible to claim to repre-
sent the power and authority of the law, and at the same time, claim to be above 
the law.1
Abstract
This paper discusses the deferral power of the Security Council under Article 16 
of the Rome Statute. It analyses the drafting history, provision and practice of 
Article 16 with a view to identifying the requirements that a situation should 
meet before the article may be invoked by the Security Council. The purpose is 
to provide guidance on the legal terrain within which the Security Council is 
authorised to act under Article 16, especially in light of its inconsistent invocation 
of the deferral power. The paper argues: firstly, that, being a creature of the law, 
the Security Council is governed and qualified by the law; and secondly, that 
Article 16 has unambiguously provided the parameters within which the Security 
Council should exercise its deferral power.
1 Judge ad hoc Sir Robert Jennings dissenting opinion in Lockerbie Case (Preliminary Objections) ICJ 1998.
* LLB (Nairobi); LLM (Pretoria); LLD (Rhodes); Advocate of the High Court of Kenya.
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Introduction
The United Nations Security Council (Security Council) is empowered by 
article 16 of  the Rome Statute2 to defer investigations and prosecutions of  cases 
brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a renewable period of  
12 months if  it determines that an investigation or prosecution would interfere 
with efforts to resolve a threat to peace, breach of  peace, or act of  aggression 
under Chapter VII of  the Charter of  the United Nations (UN).3 So far, the Se-
curity Council has been ambivalent in its use of  this provision.4 It pre-emptively 
invoked the provision in favour of  UN-peacekeepers from the ICC’s non-party 
states,5 but out-rightly refused to accede to the request on behalf  of  Omar al-
Bashir of  Sudan,6 demurred over Kenya’s request,7 and ignored Uganda’s Lord 
Resistance Army’s demand.8 Which raises the question: under what circumstanc-
es should Article 16 be invoked? This paper attempts to answer this question by 
analysing the legal terrain within which the Security Council is authorised to act 
under Article 16.
The paper is divided into seven sections. The first section provides an in-
troduction to the paper and highlights the structure of  discussion. The second 
section gives a brief  overview of  the Security Council and the ICC. The third 
section describes the general relationship between the Security Council and the 
ICC in the area of  peace and security. The fourth section focuses on the deferral 
power of  the Security Council under Article 16 of  the ICC Statute. It analyses 
Article 16’s drafting history and the manner of  framing to determine its scope of  
operation. The fifth section discusses the jurisprudence of  the Security Council 
on what amounts to threat to peace, breach of  peace and aggression, elements 
that must exist in a situation before Article 16 can be invoked. The sixth section 
analyses some of  the cases where the Security Council has been petitioned to use 
2 Statute of  the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 [Rome Statute].
3 Article 16, Rome Statute.
4 For a discussion of  the Security Council’s deferral record, see generally Falligant J, ‘The prosecution 
of  Sudanese President Al Bashir: Why Security Council deferral would harm the legitimacy of  the 
International Criminal Court’ 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2010), 727.
5 See Security Council Press Release ‘Security Council requests International Criminal Court not 
to bring cases against peacekeeping personnel from states not party to Statute’ 7 December 2002 
http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7450.doc.htm on 21 May 2015.
6 See British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Sudan: African-Arab delegation fails to convince UNSC on 
deferring ICC issue’, 13 February 2009.
7 See ‘UN refuses to defer Kenya hearing’, 9 April 2011 http://news.uk.msn.com/world/articles.
aspx?cp-documentid=156942638 on 30 May 2011.
8 See Schabas W, An introduction to the International Criminal Court Cambridge University Press, 2007, 41
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its deferral power. The aim is to expose the practice and understanding of  the 
Security Council on the scope of  its deferral power. The seventh and last section 
concludes from the study on the requirements that should be met by a situation 
before Article 16 may be invoked.
An Overview of the Security Council and the ICC
The Security Council
The Security Council is one of  the six principal organs of  the UN.9 It is es-
tablished by Chapter V of  the UN Charter10 and operates as the executive organ 
of  the UN.11 It is composed of  15 members.12 Ten of  these members are elected 
to two-year terms from the UN’s general membership.13 The remaining five seats 
are reserved for the five permanent members - China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.14 
The Security Council has the “primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of  international peace and security”.15 However, the Council also performs other 
secondary functions.16 In exercising its mandate, the Council has a wide margin 
9 The others are General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International 
Court of  Justice and Secretariat. Article 7, Charter of  the United Nations.
10 Charter of  the United Nations 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, ch V specifically Article 23.
11 See Brichambaut MC, ‘The role of  the United Nations Security Council in the international legal 
system’ in M Byers The role of  law in international politics: Essays in international relations and international 
law, Oxford University Press, 2000, 269, 270 (“When making use of  [its] powers, the Security Council 
acts as an organ that implements the Charter and not as an organ that creates legal norms”). 
12 Article 23(1), Charter of  the United Nations.
13 Article 23(2), Charter of  the United Nations. It is agreed that of  these 10 seats, 5 is for Afro-Asian 
states, 1 for Eastern Europe, 2 for Latin America and 2 for Western European and other powers. 
See General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII).
14 See “UN Sec. Council, Members” http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp on 4 March 2011 (pointing 
out that China replaced Taiwan while Russia replaced USSR from the initial list). The list comprises 
the victors of  World War II. It does not follow, however, that the five current permanent members 
will continue to hold their status. However, the complicated amendment procedure of  the UN 
Charter makes their removal unlikely. For a discussion see Report of  the open-ended working group on the 
question of  equitable representation on and increase in the membership of  the Security Council and other matters 
related to the Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/47 (2003). 
15 Article 24(1), Charter of  the United Nations. The word “primary responsibility” according to the ICJ, 
does not mean “exclusive responsibility”. See Nicaragua Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ Reports 
1984, 432.
16 These include: recommending the admission, suspension and expulsion of  member states to 
the General Assembly (Articles 4, 5 and 6, UN Charter); restoring the rights and privileges of  a 
suspended member (Articles 5 UN Charter); Amendments to the UN Charter require the ratification 
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of  discretion.17 This discretion is exercised through the voting process.18 Each 
Security Council member has one vote.19 Procedural matters require an affirma-
tive vote of  nine out of  the fifteen members, while substantive matters require 
a vote of  nine of  the fifteen members as well as the “concurring votes of  the 
permanent members”.20 This means that permanent members have the power 
to veto the substantive resolutions of  the Council but not the procedural ones.21 
A decision on what amounts to a procedural matter is itself  subject to a veto.22 
However, under the Security Council’s Rules of  Procedure,23 it is possible for the 
President of  the Security Council,24 to rule that an issue is procedural and if  the 
ruling is supported by nine members the matter is resolved.25 
of  all the permanent members of  the Council (Article 108, UN Charter); in the case of  trusteeship 
territories, for example, designated strategic areas fall within the authority of  the Security Council 
(Article 82 and 83, UN Charter); together with the General Assembly elect Judges of  the ICJ (ICJ 
Statute, Art 4).
17 The ICJ has, however, emphasised that “[t]he political character of  an organ cannot release it from 
the observance of  the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations 
on its power or criteria for its judgment.” Conditions of  Admission of  a State to Membership in the United 
Nations, ICJ Reports, 1948, 64; See also Judge Bedjaoui, Lockerbie case, ICJ Reports, 1992, 45. For 
scholarly comment, see Herdegen M ‘The “constitutionalisation” of  the UN Security Council’ 
90 American Journal of  International Law (1996) 1 at 158 (arguing that where there is “a manifest 
contradiction with the principles and purposes of  the Charter” the international community can 
challenge such SC action); Cf  Kelsen H, The law of  the United Nations. A critical analysis of  its fundamental 
problems, Stevens, London 1950, 295 (arguing that the Council has the power to enforce a decision it 
considers just even if  it is not in conformity with existing law).
18 Article 27, UN Charter. See also Goodrich L et al, Charter of  the United Nations: Commentary and documents 
UN, New York, 1969, 295-300 (discussing Security Council responses to various situations).
19 Article 27, UN Charter.
20 Article 27(3) UN Charter. Subsequent practice of  the Security Council has interpreted the phrase 
“concurring votes of  the permanent members” in Article 27 to permit abstentions. Therefore, 
an abstention by a permanent member would not be deemed as exercise of  veto power. See 
Stavropoulos C, ‘The practice of  voluntary abstentions by permanent members of  the Security 
Council under Article 27(3) of  the Charter’ 61 American Journal of  International Law (1967) 737. See 
also Namibia Case, ICJ Reports, 1971, 16, 22 (recognising this practice as lawful).
21 The veto power is exercised through a negative vote. Article 27(3) UN Charter. It was written into the 
Charter on account of  exigencies of  power, especially to placate the USSR who felt threatened by 
Western bias of  the UN at the time. See Nicholas H, The United Nations as a political institution Oxford 
University Press, 1975, 10-13.
22 See UN, Repertory of  practice of  UN Organs (1955) Supplement No 1 (1954 - 1955), vol 2, 104 (pointing 
to the statement of  sponsoring powers during adoption of  UN Charter).
23 Provisional Rules of  Procedure of  the Security Council, 21 December 1982 S/96/Rev.7. The rules 
are made pursuant to Article 30 of  the UN Charter.
24 The Presidency rotates monthly among the members in alphabetical order of  the members states’ 
official UN English names. Rules 18-20, Rules of  Procedure. 
25 See Sands P,  Klein P, Bowett’s law of  international institution, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009, 30; Shaw M 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 1237.
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The ICC
The ICC is a permanent court with an independent international legal per-
sonality.26 It is not an organ of  the UN.27 Administratively, it is structured into 
four organs: the Presidency; Judicial Divisions; Office of  the Prosecutor; Regis-
try; and Other Offices.28 The Court has jurisdiction to try individuals not states.29 
Its subject matter jurisdiction extends to genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and, pending agreement on its definition, crimes of  aggression.30 In exer-
cising its jurisdiction, the ICC complements the jurisdiction of  national courts.31 
This means that it only acts in instances where national courts are unwilling or 
unable to prosecute.32 Its jurisdiction is triggered through either: a referral to the 
prosecutor by a party to the Rome Statute;33 a referral by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of  the UN Charter;34 or a referral by the Prosecutor 
himself  acting proprio motu (on his/her own initiative).35
Each situation investigated by the Prosecutor is assigned to a pre-trial 
chamber of  the Judicial Divisions.36 The pre-trial chamber has authority to issue 
an arrest warrant for the accused if  there are reasonable grounds for the charge.37 
Once the accused is surrendered or voluntarily appears before the ICC, the pre-
26 Article 4, Rome Statute. On ICC’s history, see Kim Y, The law of  the International Criminal Court, William 
Hein & Company, 2007, 11; Schiff  B, Building the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, 201. 
27 Preamble 9, Rome Statute, (describing ICC as independent from UN).
28 Article 34, Rome Statute. 
29 This is unlike the ICJ, which has jurisdiction only over states. See Abizadeh, A ‘Introduction to the 
Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court’ 34(2) World Order (2002-2003) 19, 20 (concluding 
that the ICC “is the first permanent international court that recognises the individual as a subject of  
international criminal law”).
30 Article 5, Rome Statute. The ICC will gain jurisdiction over the crime of  aggression only if  it is 
defined through an amendment to the statute. Articles 5(2), 121 and 123, Rome Statute.
31 Articles 17, 18, Rome Statute. On complementarity see Newton MA, ‘Comparative complementarity: 
Domestic jurisdiction consistent with the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court’ 167 
Military Law Review (2001) 20. 
32 A country may be determined to be “unwilling” if  it is clearly shielding someone from responsibility 
for ICC crimes, there is undue delay in prosecution, or proceedings are not independent or impartial. 
A country may be “unable” when its legal system has collapsed. Article 17, Rome Statute. For further 
discussion, see Holmes J, ‘Complementarity: National courts versus the ICC’ in Cassese A et al, The 
Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court: A commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, 260, 674-
678; Struett M, The politics of  constructing the International Criminal Court, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 8, 95. 
33 Article 12, Rome Statute.
34 Article 13, Rome Statute.
35 Article 15, Rome Statute. 
36 The judicial division has eighteen judges organised into the pre-trial division, the trial division, and 
the appeals division. 
37 Article 58, Rome Statute.
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trial chamber holds a hearing to confirm which charges will be the basis of  the 
criminal trial.38 After the confirmation of  charges, each case is assigned to a trial 
chamber of  three judges.39 At the conclusion of  the trial, the trial chamber may 
acquit or convict and issue a sentence of  up to thirty years or life imprisonment, 
if  justified by the extreme gravity of  the crime.40 During and after the pre-trial 
and trial phases, the accused, the Prosecutor, or a concerned State may appeal 
decisions of  the Chambers to the Appeals Chamber.41
The Relationship between the Security Council and the ICC
Even though the ICC has its own independent treaty basis, it nevertheless 
has a formal relationship with the Security Council through a negotiated relation-
ship agreement with the UN.42 The Agreement sets out the mode of  cooperation 
between the ICC and the Security Council and allows the ICC to seek assistance 
from the Council in procuring the cooperation of  both state and non-state par-
ties to the Rome Statute.43 In addition to the Agreement, the Rome Statute also 
gives the Security Council powers of  referral and deferral, as well as a potential 
role in the determination of  the crime of  aggression.44 
This involvement of  the Security Council in the ICC process was borne 
out of  the recognition that the functions of  the ICC and the Council are com-
plementary as they both affect international peace and security.45 The inclusion 
of  the Security Council in the Rome Statute was, however, not without contesta-
tion.46 It was a product of  hard-fought compromise between those who wanted 
38 Article 61, Rome Statute.
39 Article 61(11), Rome Statute.
40 Article 76, 77 & 78, Rome Statute.
41 Article 81 & 82, Rome Statute.
42 See Negotiated relationship agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations 4 
October 2004 ASP/UN. 
43 Article 17, Negotiated Agreement. The Council can sanction states if  they fail to cooperate. Article 
17(3), Negotiated Agreement.
44 For a discussion, see Berman F, ‘The relationship between the International Criminal Court and the 
Security Council’ in Hebel V et al (eds), Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in honour of  
Adriaan Bos, TMC Asser Press, 1999, 173-80.
45 See Gowland-Debbas V, ‘The relationship between the Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court’ 3 Journal of  the Armed Conflict Law (1998) 97 at 99 (pointing out that situations which 
present the most compelling case for ICC prosecution are almost inevitably the ones with which the 
Security Council is concerned because they affect international peace and security).
46 See Akande D et al, ‘Position paper: an African expert study on the African Union concerns about 
Article 16 of  the Rome Statute of  the ICC’ (2010) http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PositionPaper_
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a politically-controlled court47 and those who demanded an independent justice 
institution;48 between those who valued peace over justice49 and those who saw 
justice as a precondition for peace.50 In the end, the Security Council was given 
the referral power to allow it ensure peace through justice51 and the deferral right 
to allow it delay justice as it seeks peace.52 This paper focuses on the deferral 
provision.
The Deferral Provision under Article 16
The drafting history
The drafting history of  the Rome Statute shows that Article 16 was one of  
the most contested provisions and was allowed only after several other proposals 
were considered and rejected.53 An earlier proposal presented by the Interna-
ICC.pdf  on 12 June 2014 at 8 (calling it the “thorniest issue”).
47 The US in particular wanted a much larger control of  the UN Security Council over the ICC’s 
actions. See Schabas W, ‘United States hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s all about the 
Security Council’ 15 European Journal of  International Law (2004) 701.
48 See Kirsch P and Holmes J, ‘The birth of  the International Criminal Court: The 1998 Rome 
Conference’ in Bekou O and Cryer R, The International Criminal Court, Ashgate Dartmouth, 2004, 10 
(pointing out that many of  the battles were “between those who wanted as independent a court as 
possible” and those who wanted to avoid jurisdiction over their nationals). 
49 See Schabas, ‘United States hostility to the International Criminal Court’, 701.
50 See Scheffer D, ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’ 93 American Journal of  
International Law (1999), 12. See also Scharf  M, ‘The amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of  the 
International Criminal Court’ 32 Cornell International Law Journal (1999), 507. 
51 For discussion of  the referral power see Heyder C, ‘The UN Security Council’s referral of  the crimes 
in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in light of  US opposition to the Court: Implications 
for the International Criminal Court’s functions and status’ 24 Berkeley Journal of  International Law 
(2006), 650.
52 See Sarooshi D, ‘Aspects of  the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations’ 32 Netherlands Yearbook of  International Law (2001), 27, 38-39 (Pointing out that the 
deferral power was inserted to allow the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, to demand that 
the requirements of  peace and security take precedence over the immediate demands of  justice); 
Akande D, ‘The jurisdiction of  the International Criminal Court over nationals of  non-parties: 
Legal basis and limits’ Journal of  International Criminal Justice (2003) 618, 646 (Pointing out that the 
adoption of  the deferral provision acknowledged that there are “circumstances where the exercise 
of  jurisdiction by the Court would interfere with the resolution of  an ongoing conflict by the SC”). 
53 See Report of  the International Law Commission on the Works of  its Forty-Sixth Session, 1994 
YB International Law Commission UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977 (ILC Report) 43-45; Report of  the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of  an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 50th 
Sess., Su No. 22 UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995) (Ad Hoc Committee Report) para 124; Report of  the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of  an International Criminal Court, UN GAOR, 51st 
Sess., Su No. 22 UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996) para. 141.
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tional Law Commission (ILC) which would have seen the ICC working at the 
behest of  the Security Council was considered and rejected.54 Article 23(3) of  the 
ILC draft of  1994 provided: 
No prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is 
being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of  the peace or an act of  ag-
gression under Chapter VII of  the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise decides.55
Under this proposal, an investigation or prosecution arising from a situa-
tion “being dealt with” by the Security Council under Chapter VII of  the UN 
Charter would not have been initiated or continued unless authorised by the 
Council or unless the Council was through with the matter, whichever came 
first.56 The Security Council would thus have had the power to approve ICC’s 
investigations and prosecutions, and a veto by a permanent member would have 
been enough to prevent the ICC from working.57 
This position was supported mostly by the permanent members of  the 
Security Council58 who asserted that since the Council had the primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of  international peace and security, the ICC should 
automatically accedes jurisdiction to the Council in situations where the inves-
tigation or prosecution of  a particular case by the ICC could interfere with the 
resolution of  an ongoing conflict by the Security Council.59 
Many states, while not opposing the role of  Council in the ICC process,60 
however, found the ILC proposal too sweeping.61 They were concerned that the 
54 For a discussion on ILC and its drafting procedure, see Shaw M, International law, 112. 
55 ILC Report, 27.
56 See Gargiulo P ‘The controversial relationship between the International Criminal Court and the 
Security Council’ in Schabas W and Lattanzi F (eds) Essays on the Rome Statute of  the International 
Criminal Court, Fagnano Alto, 1999, 86.
57 See Bergsmo M, ‘Occasional remarks on certain state concerns about the jurisdictional reach of  the 
International Criminal Court, and their possible implications for the relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council’ 69 Nordic Journal of  International Law (2000) 87, 107 (pointing out that “the 
permanent five members of  the Council would have had an effective veto power over the Court, also 
as non-parties”). 
58 These members included the United States, China and France. See Hall C, “The first and second 
session of  the UN Preparatory Committee on the establishment of  an International Criminal 
Court” American Journal of  International Law (1997) 91, 182.
59 See Condorelli L and Villalpando S, ‘Referral and deferral by the Security Council’ in Cassese A, The 
Rome Statute of  International Criminal Court 644, 645; Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of  an 
International Criminal Court Report.
60 See Kirsch and Holmes, ‘The birth of  the International Criminal Court’, 26 (pointing out that “[o]
nly a few delegations opposed a role for the Security Council in relation to the court (referrals and 
deferrals), but they showed great persistence”).
61 See Statement of  Hann Suchova, Minister of  Justice of  Poland, 17 June 1998, http://www.un.org/
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Council, being a quintessentially political body, might abuse its power and ob-
struct the functioning of  the Court.62 The phrase “being dealt with” was attacked 
on the ground that it could easily be construed as preventing ICC jurisdiction, 
even where the Security Council had merely placed a matter on its agenda.63 On 
the whole, it was feared that the proposal if  adopted would introduce inappro-
priate political influence into the judicial function of  the court; undermine its 
independence and impartiality; and ultimately render its work ineffective.64
Given these concerns, the delegates to the Rome Conference had, there-
fore, to craft a provision that would guarantee the Security Council’s overarching 
responsibility for peace and security when acting under the Rome Statute without 
affecting the independence of  the Court.65 A compromise formula was finally 
reached, which provided that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of  
the UN Charter, could adopt a resolution requesting deferral of  an investigation 
or prosecution for a renewable period of  twelve months.66 The wording of  this 
icc/index.htm; Statement of  Javan Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister to the Islamic Republic of  Iran, 
17 June 1998, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm; Statement of  Ivan Raig, Deputy Head of  the 
Delegation of  the Republic of  Estonia, 17 June 1998, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm; Statement 
of  Pavel Telicka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic, available at http://
www.un.org/icc/index.htm; Statement of  Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj, Attorney General of  the 
Republic of  Trinidad and Tobago, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm; Statement of  Laila Freivalds, 
Minister of  Justice of  Sweden, 15 June 1998, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm; Statement of  
Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs of  Canada, 15 June 1998, http://www.un.org/icc/
index.htm all on 2 October 2014. 
62 See Bergsmo M and Pejic J, ‘Article 16: Deferral of  investigation or prosecution’ in Triffterer O (ed) 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court: Observers notes, article by article, Baden-
Baden, 1999, 373 (pointing out that delegates feared that the Security Council would perpetually 
hold the ICC hostage to its veto power).
63 The states were apprehensive that if  adopted, the provision would have been thrown into similar 
interpretative chaos that Article 12(1) of  the UN Charter finds itself  in today. Article 12(1) which 
forbids the General Assembly from considering any matter over which the Security Council can be 
said to be “exercising” its power has been given varied interpretation by different commentators to 
date. See Kelsen, The law of  the United Nations, 198.
64 See Yee L, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16’ in Lee 
R (ed) The International Criminal Court: The making of  the Rome Statute, issues, negotiations, results, Kluwer 
Law International, 1999, 150 (pointing out the fear that the Council may disrupt the ICC’s ability 
to function independently); Kirsch P and Holmes J, ‘The Rome Conference on an International 
Criminal Court: The negotiating process’ 93(1) The American Journal of  International Law (1999) 2, 4 
(pointing out the fear of  politics within the Council).
65 See Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and deferral by the Security Council’ 644; Akande et al, 
‘Position paper’.
66 Arsanjani M, ‘The Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court’ 93 American Journal of  
International Law (1999) 22, 26-27; Condorelli and Villalpando ‘Referral and deferral by the Security 
Council’, 645; Bergsmo and Pejic ‘Article 16’, 598. 
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final formula was based on the proposals put forth by Singapore,67 Costa Rica,68 
Canada,69 and Britain.70 This formula, reflected in the final version of  Article 16, 
effectively diminished the authority of  the Council by requiring it to act to pre-
vent an investigation or prosecution rather than to act to authorise one.71 
The provision
Article 16 provides in full: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute 
for a period of  12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of  the Charter of  the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that re-
quest may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.72 
The provision gives the Security Council the right to defer any investiga-
tion or prosecution by the ICC for one year, with the possibility of  renewing the 
deferral.73 Unlike the ILC proposal, the Security Council must now act positively 
on the basis of  a resolution requesting the Court to defer its investigation.74 For 
this to happen, there must be a prior determination by the Security Council that 
there exists a threat to the peace, breach of  the peace, or act of  aggression.75 
Such a determination would require an affirmative vote of  9 members, including 
the concurring votes of  all the permanent members.76 A negative vote by any of  
67 The Singaporean proposal stated that “no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or 
proceeded with under this Statute where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII of  the 
Charter of  the United Nations, given a direction to that effect.” Non-Paper/WG.3/No.16 (8 August 
1997).
68 Costa Rica proposed a clause requiring a “formal and specific decision” of  the Security Council. 
Non-Paper/WG.3/No.23 (11 August 1997).
69 Canada suggested a temporal qualification of  twelve months. See Yee, ‘The International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council’, 151 (citing the Canada’s suggestion).
70 British delegation suggested substituting the word “direction” with “request.” Bergsmo and Pejic 
‘Article 16’, 376.
71 See Bergsmo and Pejic ‘Article 16’, 375.
72 Article 16, Rome Statute.
73 Ad Hoc Committee Report.
74 See Bergsmo and Pejic ‘Article 16’, 598. 
75 But see Gowland-Debbas V, ‘The functions of  the United Nations Security Council in the 
international legal system’ in Byers M The role of  law in international politics: Essays in international relations 
and international law, Oxford University Press, 2000, 277, 298 (wondering whether it is the situation 
itself  or the courts commencement of  an investigation into the commission of  a crime that would 
constitute a threat to or breach to peace).
76 Matters treated by the Security Council as substantive matter requiring “concurring votes of  the 
permanent members” have included, inter alia, those relating to the discharge of  its responsibility for 
the maintenance of  international peace and security. See Hambro E et al, Charter of  the United Nations: 
Commentary and documents, Columbia University Press, 1969, 215.
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the permanent members is, therefore, sufficient to veto any such determination 
by the Council.77 This requirement of  unanimity among permanent members 
effectively means that ICC’s proceedings can only be deferred by a “concerted 
effort” of  the Council members.78 
Furthermore, the Security Council will have to specify that any investiga-
tion or prosecution commenced or continued by the ICC does interfere with its 
mandate of  maintaining international peace and security.79 This means that it has 
to show that in the absence of  its decision to suspend all investigations and pros-
ecutions under Article 16, international peace and security would be threatened.80 
This of  necessity requires the Security Council to specify the particular situation 
or case whose investigation or prosecution would undermine the maintenance of  
international peace and security.81 
There is also a temporal limit of  one year which can only be renewed by a 
new resolution of  the Security Council, again acting under Chapter VII of  the 
UN Charter.82 This means that the Security Council must again make a posi-
tive statement in the form of  a resolution that, should the ICC recommence or 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution, such action would interfere with 
77 Theoretically, an ICC proceeding cannot be impeded even if  all five permanent Council members 
joined to block the proceeding; nine positive votes are required to inhibit the block, including those 
from the five permanent members. Article 27(3) UN Charter. 
78 See Schabas W, ‘International Criminal Court: The secret of  its success’ 12(4) Criminal Law 
Forum (2001) 415, 422 (arguing that this requirement of  unanimity “means that deferral will only 
be conceivable in the clearest and most exceptional of  circumstances”). See also Pogany I, ‘The 
Security Council Resolution of  November 22 1967 – its legal nature and implications’ 4 Israel Law 
Review (1969) 229, 229 (noting that Council decisions are highly regarded because of  “consensus of  
opinion amongst its members, and more particularly amongst its permanent members”).
79 Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council’, 150; Saroshi, ‘Aspects of  the 
relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations’, 27; Akande, ‘The 
jurisdiction of  the International Criminal Court over nationals of  non-parties’, 618.
80 See Bergsmo and Pejic, ‘Article 16’, 378 (arguing that Article 16 recognises a Council power to “request 
the Court not to investigate or prosecute when the requisite majority of  its members conclude that 
judicial action – or threat to it – might harm the Council’s effort to maintain international peace and 
security pursuant to the Charter”). See also Cassese A, ‘The Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court: Some preliminary reflections’ 10 European Journal of  International Law (1999) 144, 146, 163. For 
a different view see Condorelli and Villalpando, ‘Referral and deferral by the Security Council’, 647.
81 See, for example, Nolte G, ‘The limits of  the Security Council’s powers and its functions in the 
international legal system: Some reflections’ in Byers M, The role of  law in international politics: Essays in 
international relations and international law Oxford University Press, 2000, 315, 321 (arguing that Security 
Council action “must remain preliminary and situation specific”).
82 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Article 16’ http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/15/q-article-16 (“To 
trigger any further suspension, the Security Council must once more consider whether or not to 
invoke Article 16.”).
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the maintenance of  international peace and security under Chapter VII.83 Conse-
quently, the ICC can recommence exercising its jurisdiction once the 12 months 
period lapses unless it is requested again not to do so by a resolution of  the 
Council under Chapter VII of  the UN Charter.84
The effect of a deferral
The language of  Article 16 allows the Security Council to request a suspen-
sion of  an “investigation or prosecution”.85 However, the use of  the permissive 
word “may” in Article 16 reserves the Court the right to accept or decline the 
request.86 This means that a request from the Council does not automatically 
compel the ICC to defer a case.87 Where the Court accepts such a request, the 
ICC - including all of  its organs - is to halt all investigations or prosecutions of  
that situation or case.88 This does not, however, preclude the Prosecutor from 
conducting or continuing “preliminary examinations.”89 But a deferral does pose 
a challenge to the protection of  wit nesses, victims and evidence, and the guar-
anteeing of  the rights of  the accused, especially where an accused is in custody 
83 But see Wedgwood R, ‘The International Criminal Court: An American view’ 10(1) European Journal 
of  International Law (1999) 93, 97 (calling such an argument a “palace revolution”).
84 Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council’, 151.
85 Article 16, Rome Statute.
86 The Tadic case suggests that the ICC can assert authority to independently assess whether the 
requirements under Article 16 have been met as part of  its incidental power to determine the 
propriety of  its own jurisdiction. Prosecutor v Tadic, Case Number IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 1995), 6. For 
a comment on this case, see Alvarez J, ‘Nuremberg revisited: The Tadic Case’ 7 European Journal of  
International Law (1996), 245. 
87 But see Keller L, ‘The false dichotomy of  peace versus justice and the International Criminal Court’ 
3 Hague Justice Journal (2008)12, 19 (pointing out that a desire to avoid conflict with the Security 
Council might prompt the ICC to honour an Article 16 deferral request). Compare with Nolte G, 
‘The limits of  the Security Council’s powers and its functions in the international legal system’ 316 
(arguing that where majority of  Council members pass a resolution with a view that it does not meet 
the requirements of  Article 39 then such a resolution would be a clear example of  ultra vires act that 
is not enforceable).
88 See Martenczuk B, ‘The Security Council, the International Court and judicial review: What lessons 
from Lockerbie?’ 10 (3) European Journal of  International Law (1999) 517, 545.
89 See De Gurmendi F, ‘The role of  the international prosecutor’ in Lee, The International Criminal Court, 
175-189 (retracing the negotiating history of  the role of  the Prosecutor and concluding that the 
intention of  the parties was that an investigation by the Prosecutor only begins after the authorisation 
of  the Pre-trial Chamber before that the Prosecutor only engages in preliminary inquiry). But see 
Wagner M, ‘The ICC and its jurisdiction – myths, misperceptions and realities’ in Von Bogdandy 
A and Wolfrum R (eds) Max Planck Yearbook of  the United Nations Law Volume 7, The Netherlands, 
Koninklijke Brill N.V, 2003, 409, 498 (arguing that where a preliminary examination constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security it is also suspended).
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when such a request is made.90 How this challenge is to be handled is yet to be 
resolved.91
Meaning of Threat to Peace, Breach of Peace and Act of Aggression
Article 16 requires that the Security Council acts under Chapter VII of  the 
UN Charter.92 Actions by the Security Council under Chapter VII are triggered 
by a determination under Article 39 that there is either a threat to peace, breach 
of  peace, or an act of  aggression.93 What these terms mean is, however, not set-
tled as Security Council’s practice shows that its determinations depend upon the 
circumstances of  each case and the political (rarely legal) considerations at play.94 
Nevertheless, from these past determinations one can find guidance as to the 
meaning of  these terms, even though subsequent determinations by the Security 
Council are not bound by precedence.95
Threat to peace
The practice of  the Security Council shows an expansion in the meaning of  
threat to peace.96 In its Summit Declaration of  31 January 1991, it acknowledged 
90 Considering the potential indefinite time period for which de ferrals can be made, such a situation 
would pose serious problems, as fundamental judicial guarantees, such as the right not to be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention under Article 9 (1) of  the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) could be infringed. Delays in litigation hamper the interests of  justice. 
Documents may be lost. Witnesses may disappear. Memories of  witnesses may fade.
91 For further discussion, see El Zeddy M, ‘United States dropped the atomic bomb of  Article 16 of  
the ICC Statute: Security Council’s power of  deferrals and Resolution 1422’ 35 Vanderbilt Journal of  
Transnational Law (2002) 1503, 1512-1517.
92 See discussion under “The Provision” above.
93 Article 39, UN Charter. But see Harris D, Cases and materials on international law Sweet & Maxwell, 
1983, 676 (noting that “more often than not, the Security Council acts under Chapter VII without 
discussing the question of  jurisdiction under Article 39 at all, let alone deciding under which part of  
Article 39 … its jurisdiction is founded”).
94 See Goodrich et al, Charter of  the United Nations, 295-300 (Concluding that the Council’s 
determinations are situational and political). See also Gowland-Debbas, ‘The functions of  the United 
Nations Security Council in the international legal system’ 287 (Pointing out that Security Council 
determinations “does not have to insist on the production of  evidence, cross-examine witnesses, 
or examine legal considerations in any depth”). However, the Council has sometimes resorted to 
or called for fact finding (e.g. in the case of  Iraq (Res. 674 (1990), Yugoslavia (Res. 780 (1992), and 
Rwanda (Res.935 (1994)). In addition, under Article 32 of  the UN Charter, the Council is required 
to invite States parties to the dispute if  these are not members of  the Council. 
95 See Nolte, ‘The limits of  the Security Council’s powers and its functions in the international legal 
system’, 323 (“when the Council states, for example, that violations of  humanitarian law or excessive or 
indiscriminate uses of  force have occurred, this is not a statement that is meant to be determinative”). 
96 See Gray C, International law and use of  force: Foundations of  international law, Oxford University Press, 
2004, 197.
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that threats to international peace and security can come from “…sources of  
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological field”.97 In reac-
tion to India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests it reiterated that “the proliferation of  
all weapons of  mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security”.98 In creating the international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda on the basis of  Chapter VII, it demonstrated that lack of  punish-
ment for individuals who are responsible for violations of  international humani-
tarian law could also represent a threat to peace.99 On Libya’s refusal to hand over 
the Lockerbie suspects to US and Sudan’s refusal to hand over suspects wanted 
in connection with an assassination attempt against the President of  Egypt to 
Ethiopia, it determined that failure of  countries to extradite perpetrators of  in-
ternational crimes amounted to threat to peace.100 
On the white minority regime in Rhodesia it found that widespread racial 
discrimination constituted a threat to peace.101 On the Middle East War, it held 
that a country entering into the territory of  another country to conduct hostilities 
constituted a threat to peace.102 On the conflicts in Liberia,103 Rwanda,104 former 
Yugoslavia,105 Sierra Leone,106 Sudan,107 and Democratic Republic of  Congo,108 it 
found that civil war situations leading to widespread violations of  international 
humanitarian law also constituted a threat to international peace.109 On Iraq gov-
ernment’s mistreatment of  the Kurds, it determined that repressions of  civilian 
populations leading to considerable refugee flows were a threat to peace.110 On 
the Somali conflict it found that obstacles to distribution of  humanitarian as-
sistance constituted a threat to international peace.111 Similarly, on the ouster 
of  President Aristide of  Haiti, the Council determined that coups leading to 
97 UN Doc. S/24111 (1992).
98 Res 1172 (1998). See also Res 1540 (2004).
99 Res 827 (1993) and Res 955 (1994) respectively.
100 Res 748 (1992) and Res 1070 (1996) respectively.
101 Res 216 (1965), 217 (1965) & 221 (1966).
102 Res 54 (1948).
103 Res 788 (1992).
104 Res 955 (1994).
105 Res 713 (1991), 743 (1992), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) & 827(1993).
106 Res 1315 (2000).
107 Res 1593 (2005).
108 Res 161 (1961).
109 See White N, Keeping the peace: the United Nations and the maintenance of  international peace and security 
Manchester University Press, 1993, 940 (stating that internal conflict threatens international peace 
because “the civil war could suck in outside forces including the superpowers”.
110 Res 688 (1991).
111 Res 794 (1992); See also Res 751 (1992).
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“incidence of  humanitarian crises, including mass displacement of  population” 
were threats to international peace.112 In the same case, it also held that failure to 
respect peace agreements amounted to threat to peace and security.113 
In summary, the practice of  the Security Council shows that threat to peace 
is a wide concept that can arise from unlimited number of  situations. However, 
as the resolutions on the creation of  international criminal tribunals for former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrate, threat to peace can also arise from failure 
to punish violations of  international crimes. In this regard, one can safely argue 
that any request for deferral of  ICC’s mandate under the Rome Statute on the 
basis of  threat to peace must demonstrate that the threat from ICC’s action 
outweighs the threat that would arise from failure to prosecute the said crimes.
Breach of peace
The Security Council has determined that a situation amounts to breach 
of  the peace in at least four situations: In the 1950 North Korean invasion of  
South Korea;114 in the 1982 Argentine Invasion of  the Falkland Islands;115 in the 
1987 Iran-Iraq war;116 and in the 1990 Iraqi invasion of  Kuwait.117 In all these 
cases there was the actual invasion of  one country by another leading to armed 
conflict, meaning that actual invasion of  one country by another would amount 
to breach of  peace.118
Acts of aggression
In 1974 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution defining aggres-
sion.119 Article 1 of  the said resolution defines aggression as the use of  armed 
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of  another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Na-
tions Charter.120 At Article 3, the resolution gives a number of  examples of  acts 
of  aggression including the use of  weapons by a state against the territory of  
112 Res 841 (1993).
113 Res 873 (1993).
114 Res S/1501 (1950).
115 Res 502 (1982).
116 Res 598 (1987).
117 Res 660 (1990).
118 On “war” and “armed conflict” see Meng W, ‘War’ 4 Encyclopaedia of  Public International Law (1982) 
282; Partsch K, ‘Armed conflict’ 1 Encyclopaedia of  Public International Law (1992) 249.
119 GA Res 3314 (XXIX). 
120 Article 1, GA Res 3314.
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another state, and attack by the armed forces of  a state on the land, sea or air 
forces of  another state and sending by, or on behalf  of, a state of  armed bands 
to carry out acts of  armed force against another state.121 This clarification of  
some of  the features of  the concept of  aggression might prove of  some use to 
the Security Council in determining an act of  aggression for purposes of  Article 
16.122 However, under the Resolution, the Security Council retains the right to 
examine all relevant circumstances before determining that an act amounts to ag-
gression.123 Already, the Council has made some determinations.124 It condemned 
as acts of  aggression: the 1976 South African action against Angola;125 the 1977 
Rhodesian action against Mozambique;126 the 1985 Israeli action against PLO 
headquarters in Tunisia;127 and the 1990 Iraqi action against diplomatic premises 
and personnel in Kuwait. 128
A Review of Security Council Practice under Article 16
The practice of  the Council with regard to Article 16 is so far inconclu-
sive.129 The emerging trend, however, is that a decision under Article 16 would 
depend upon the circumstances of  each case and the relationship of  the five 
permanent members of  the Council to the issue under consideration.130 This sec-
tion highlights some of  the decisions of  the Security Council under Article 16.
Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) 
On 12 July 2002, less than two weeks after the Rome Statute entered into 
force on 1 July 2002, the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 
1422.131 The Resolution pre-emptively suspended the investigation or prosecu-
121 Article 3, Res 3314.
122 Article 16, Rome Statute.
123 Article 4, GA Res 3314.
124 For a discussion, see Shaw M, International law, 1237.
125 Res 387 (1976).
126 Res 411 (1977).
127 Res 573 (1985).
128 Res 667 (1990).
129 The Council has only dealt formally with one case involving UN peacekeepers. See Murphy S, 
‘Efforts to obtain immunity from ICC for US peacekeepers’ 96 American Journal of  International law 
(2002) 725.
130 This is because a negative vote by any of  the permanent members is sufficient to block all but 
procedural resolutions of  the Council, Article 27, UN Charter.
131 Security Council Resolution 1422, UN Doc S/RES/1422, 12 July 2002 (Res 1422).
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tion by ICC of  cases involving “current or former officials or personnel from a 
contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating 
to a United Nations established or authorised operation.”132 The resolution was 
passed at the insistence of  the United States (US) who threatened to veto renewal 
of  existing UN peacekeeping missions or approval of  any future peacekeeping 
operations.133 The US made it clear that the reason for its demand was its concern 
about the exposure of  its citizens who work as UN peacekeepers throughout the 
world to the ICC jurisdiction.134 
Many states were, however, not comfortable with the resolution.135 Some 
of  them argued that the resolution, by providing for automatic unlimited renew-
als, effectively modified the terms of  the Rome Statute without amendment of  
the treaty.136 Others pointed to the ‘deep injustice’137 of  discriminating between 
peacekeepers sent from state parties to the Rome Statute and those sent from 
non-state parties.138 The same theme was picked up by the civil society who ex-
pressed the view that the Security Council’s actions were incompatible with the 
Rome Statute and if  unchallenged would irredeemably dent the image, impartial-
ity and credibility of  the Court.139
However, in spite of  these concerns, the resolution was renewed on 12 June 
2003 under the same condition for a further period of  12 months by the Security 
Council’s adoption of  Resolution 1487.140 In the new Resolution, the Security 
Council expressed its intention, as it had done in Resolution 1422, to renew the 
suspension ‘under the same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month periods 
for as long as may be necessary’.141 The renewal demonstrated the politicised na-
ture of  Article 16 and the ability of  a veto-wielding superpower to arm-twist other 
132 Res 1422, para 1.
133 See statement by the United States’ representative at the Security Council’s meeting of  10 July 2002. 
UN Doc S/PV/4568, at 9-10. 
134 US Statement, 9. This was despite the fact that, as the Secretary-General noted in a letter to Colin 
Powell on 3 July 2002, such persons were already subject to the jurisdiction of  the ICTY. 
135 See, for example, the statement of  the over 100-member state Non-Aligned Movement. XIII 
Conference of  Heads of  State or Government of  the Non-Aligned Movement, Doc NAM XIII/
Summit/Final Document.
136 See Letter from the Ambassadors to the UN of  Canada, Brazil, New Zealand and South Africa to 
the President of  the Security Council. UN Doc S/2002/754, 12 July 2002. 
137 UN SCOR, 58th Session, 8-9 (Quoting Felipe Paolillo of  Uruguay).
138 UN SCOR, 8-9.
139 See, for example, Coalition for the ICC ‘Excerpts from the Special Plenary of  the Prep Com on the 
ICC’ 3 July 2002 http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Excerpts_from_3July02.pdf  (on 
20 October 2014).
140 Security Council Resolution 1487, UN Doc S/RES/1487, 12 June 2003.
141 Res 1487.
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states in voting for its presumed national interests.142 Nevertheless, unlike Resolu-
tion 1422 which was passed unanimously, Resolution 1487 was approved by only 
12 votes with Germany, France and Syria all abstaining.143 These abstentions must 
have emboldened other Security Council members to come out and openly op-
pose the resolution144 because when the US attempted to renew the resolution 
again in 2004, it was not able to secure enough votes forcing it to unceremoni-
ously withdraw the resolution from the agenda of  the Security Council.145 
The case of Sudan
In March 2005, the Security Council, acting under its authority in Article 
39 of  the UN Charter and Article 13 of  the Rome Statute, referred the situation 
in the western region of  Sudan (Darfur) to the ICC Prosecutor.146 The referral 
followed a UN Commission recommendation that the Security Council refer the 
situation to the ICC.147 The Prosecutor opened the case for investigation on 6 
June 2005.148 Three years later, in July 2008, the Prosecutor requested an arrest 
warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, based on evi-
dence that he committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.149 
On 12 February 2009, a joint delegation of  the African Union and Arab League 
in New York made a failed attempt to convince Security Council members of  the 
142 See Cryer R et al An introduction to international criminal law and procedure Cambridge University Press, 
2007, 138.
143 UN SCOR, 58th Session, 4772nd meeting, UN Doc S/PV.4772, 12 June 2003, 11.
144 See the statement of  Nertherlands during the debate on resolution 1487 (UN SCOR, 58th Session, 
8-9) and statement of  Syria on behalf  of  Arab Countries (UN SCOR, 58th Session, 25-26). 
145 See Coalition for the ICC ‘Chronology of  the adoption of  Security Council Resolutions 1422/1487 
and withdrawal of  the proposed renewal in 2004’ http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/
FS-1422and1487Chronology_26March2008.pdf  on 14 June 2014 (Quoting US Withdrawal 
statement: “The United States has decided not to proceed with further consideration and action on 
the draft at this time to avoid a prolonged and divisive debate”).
146 SC Res. 1593, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005). 
147 The Commission of  Inquiry was established by the UN Secretary General upon direction by the 
Security Council (See SC Res. 1564, para 12, UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (18 September 2004)). In its 
January 2005 report, the Commission concluded that serious war crimes and crimes against humanity 
had been clearly committed in Darfur and recommended that the Security Council immediately refer 
jurisdiction over the crimes to the ICC. See Report of  the International Commission for Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January 2005), para 569.
148 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘Cases & Situations: Darfur’ http://www.iccnow.
org/?mod=darfur on 5 March 2014.
149 ICC Press Release, ‘ICC Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, For genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur’ 14 July 2008, http:// 
www2.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20% 
282008%29/a on 5 March 2014. 
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need to defer the case against Al Bashir.150 In the same month the Sudanese gov-
ernment entered into a declaration of  goodwill with the Darfur rebels expressing 
their willingness to engage in a peace process in an attempt to convince the ICC 
not to issue the arrest warrant.151 
Despite these efforts, on 4 March 2009, the ICC pre-trial chamber granted 
the Prosecutor’s request and issued a warrant for Al Bashir’s arrest.152 Following 
the arrest warrant, several regional organisations153 and personalities154 called on 
the Security Council members to defer the prosecution of  Al Bashir.155 They 
argued that prosecution of  President Al Bashir would negatively affect the peace 
efforts in Darfur.156 This position got the support of  two Security Council per-
manent members, China and Russia, but was rejected by the United Kingdom, 
France and the US in favour of  the prosecution of  Al Bashir.157 Because of  this 
lack of  unanimity, a motion on the deferral of  Al Bashir case was not moved 
within the Security Council158 forcing the AU in August 2009 to instruct its mem-
bers not to cooperate with the ICC in executing the warrant.159 
However, the threats of  the AU seem not to have worked as a formal de-
bate on the deferral is yet to take place within the Security Council.160 Even if  
150 British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Sudan: African-Arab delegation fails to convince UNSC on 
deferring ICC issue’ 13 February 2009.
151 This agreement was described as a possible “kick-start” to peace and a “confidence-building 
agreement.” See Baldauf  S, ‘Why did Sudan make a deal with Darfur rebels?’ Christian Science Monitor, 
18 February 2009.
152 ICC Press Release, ‘ICC issues a warrant of  arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of  Sudan’ 3 April 
2009 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/0EF62173-05ED-403A-80C8-F15EE1D25BB3.htm on 
10/5/2014). 
153 These included the African Union, Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organisation of  
Islamic Conference. 
154 For example, current president of  South Sudan, Salva Kiir, warned of  a return to civil war. ‘Sudan 
VP warns of  return to civil war’, Voice of  America News, 15 January 2009, http://www.voanews.com/
english/archive/2009-01/2009-01-15-voa38.cfm? CFID=126181033&CFTOKEN=15892117&jse
ssionid=88305dfa1d6f404e4cb62654e505bc5c75d5 on 20 July 2014.
155 See Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘Darfur: possibility of  Article 16 deferral of  ICC’s 
investigation in Darfur, debate at the 63rd UNGA and related deliberations by the UN Security 
Council’ Sept. 22, 2008 http:// www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=3093 on 6 May 2014. 
156 Heavens A, ‘China urges deferral of  Bashir war crimes case’ Reuters 7 January 2009 http://www.
reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL7563091 on 20 May 2014.
157 Security Council, ‘Update Report No 4: Sudan’ 28 July 2008 at 6.
158 ‘China urges African UNSC members to request ICC deferral for Bashir’ 8 January 2009, available 
http:// www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article29799 on 5 March 2014.
159 However, some AU countries, including Botswana, Chad, Uganda, and South Africa, later 
recommitted to the ICC. See BBC; ‘South Africa reverses decision on arrest of  Sudan’s Al Bashir’ 3 
August 2009.
160 Margesson R et al, “International Criminal Court cases in Africa: Status and policy issues” Congressional 
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a motion for deferral were to be brought, it seems unlikely that a resolution for 
a deferral would pass, given the continued division among the Security Council 
members on how to deal with the Darfur conflict.161
The case of Uganda
On 16 December 2003, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni referred the 
situation concerning the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda to 
the ICC for investigation and possible prosecution.162 In June 2004, the ICC 
commenced its investigations.163 One year later, on 8 July 2005, the ICC prosecu-
tor applied for and obtained arrest warrants for five top leaders of  the LRA.164 
The warrants were issued under seal to protect the victims, but were subsequent-
ly unsealed on 13 October 2005.165 
The indictments brought the LRA leaders to the negotiating table, but they 
insisted that the warrants be lifted as a condition of  peace.166 Many Ugandan 
peace organisations also argued that ICC involvement would harm peace pro-
gress in the region.167 Article 16 was suggested as a solution to allow for the 
promotion of  peace and security.168 However, no state was willing to take the case 
up for consideration at the Security Council.169 On 10 March 2008, a delegation 
of  the LRA went to The Hague allegedly to lobby the ICC to drop its arrest war-
Research Service, 7 March 2011 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158489.pdf  on 10 May 
2014.
161 Security Council Report, 5.
162 ICC Press Release, ‘President of  Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) to the ICC’, ICC20040129-44-En, 29 February 2004. For background to the conflict, see 
Allen T, Trial justice: the International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Zed books, 2006; 
Apuuli P, ‘The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency 
in Northern Uganda’ 15 Criminal Law Forum (2004) 391, 392-94.
163 ICC Press Release ‘Warrant of  arrest unsealed against five LRA commanders’ 14 October 2005 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/114.html on 10 May 2014.
164 See ICC ‘Arrest warrants for Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic 
Ongwen’ http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105/c0105_docAll1.html on 10 May 2014.
165 Situation in Uganda: Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for unsealing of  the warrants of  arrest, Case No. 
ICC-02/04-01/05 (13 October, 2005) para 4-27. The warrants are yet to be executed with reports 
indicating that some of  the indictees could already be dead. See ICC Press Release ‘LRA warrants 
now outstanding for four years’ ICC-OTP-20090708-PR434 08 July 2009; See also, Hague Justice 
Portal, ‘LRA delegation meets ICC Registry officials’ 10 March 2008.
166 Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, 39-40.
167 Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, 201.
168 Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, 41-42 (referring to a remark made by the 
head of  the International Crisis Group at a symposium organised by the Office of  the Prosecutor).
169 Security Council ‘Update Report Number 2: Uganda’ 20 March 2007. 
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rants.170 They were snubbed by the Prosecutor.171 To date, LRA’s plea has largely 
been ignored despite constant reiteration by the Security Council of  the need to 
bring the Ugandan conflict to a closure.172
The case of Kenya
On 5 November 2009, the Prosecutor of  the ICC acting proprio motu noti-
fied the President of  the Court of  his intention to begin investigation into the 
post 2007 election violence in Kenya.173 On 31 March 2010, Pre-trial Chamber II 
of  the Court authorised the investigation.174 Nine months later, on 15 December 
2010, the prosecutor submitted to Pre-trial Chamber two applications to sum-
mon five senior Kenyan officials and one journalist.175 Immediately thereafter, 
Kenya began to pursue a deferral of  the ICC proceedings.176 On 31 January 2011, 
Kenya got support from the AU who asked its members on the Security Council 
to place the issue on the Council’s agenda.177 Despite these efforts, on 8 March 
2011, the Pre-trial Chamber granted the request of  the Prosecutor and issued 
summonses to appear for the six individuals.178
Ten days later, on 18 March 2011 the Security Council held an informal 
interactive dialogue with representatives of  Kenya and AU to discuss Kenya’s 
170 See ICC ‘ICC Registry officials meet with LRA Delegation’ The Hague, 10 March 2008 http://www.
icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/344.html on 15 March 2014.
171 Security Council Report of  13 August 2012 available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
chronology/lra-affected-areas.php?page=3 on 4 September 2014.
172 See, for example, Security Council ‘Statement by the President of  the Security Council’ 16 
November 2006 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Uganda % 20SPRST200645.pdf  on 20 May 2014.
173 ICC Office of  the Prosecutor, Factsheet: Situation in the Republic of  Kenya, 15 December 2010. On 
Kenyan conflict see, for example, OHCHR, ‘Report from the OHCHR Fact-finding Mission to 
Kenya, 6-28 February 2008’ ICC-01/09-3-Anx7.
174 Pre-Trial Chamber II, “Decision pursuant to Article 15 of  the Rome Statute on the Authorization of  an 
investigation into the situation in the Republic of  Kenya”, ICC-01/09-19-Corr.
175 Prosecutor’s application pursuant to Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap 
Sang ICC-01/09-30-Conf-Exp, 15 December 2010; Prosecutor’s application pursuant to Article 58 as to 
Francis Kirimimu Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohamed Hussein Ali ICC-02/09-30-Conf-Exp, 
15 December 2010.
176 ‘Press Statement by Hon. Amos Wako, Hon. Prof. George Saitoti and Hon. Mutula Kilonzo on ICC 
summons,’ Statement, Office of  the Government spokesperson, Kenya, 9 March 2011, http://www.
communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=1274&media_type=2 on 10 April 2014; But see also “Kenya: 
Reject Plea for ICC Deferral, ODM Asks UN” by Leftie P and Menya W, Daily Nation/AllAfrica, 13 
March 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201103140051.html.
177 Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI).
178 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang ICC-01/09-01/11-01 08-
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deferral request.179 During the interactive dialogue, Kenya argued that a deferral 
would allow it time to deal with the alleged crimes.180 Majority of  Council mem-
bers were, however, not persuaded that the plea met the threshold for a deferral 
under Article 16.181 They suggested that Kenya utilise Article 19 of  the Rome 
Statute to directly challenge the admissibility of  the case against its nationals 
before the ICC.182 Members’ attention was also drawn to fact that the request did 
not enjoy the support of  all parties in Kenya’s coalition government.183 
On 23 March, Kenya wrote a letter to the President of  the Security Council 
requesting for an open debate on Kenya’s request for deferral.184 The request 
was not granted as not much seemed to have changed among Council members’ 
views since the informal interactive dialogue.185 On 31 March 2011, Kenya opted 
to apply directly to the ICC to have the cases deferred to its jurisdiction under 
Article 19 of  the Rome Statute.186 This application was rejected by the Court on 
30 May 2011, on the ground that, despite indications that it would do so, Kenya 
had failed to seriously investigate the crimes committed in the post-election vio-
lence 187 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that in principle, the Security Council possesses a 
wide margin of  appreciation in the exercise of  its mandate under the UN Char-
ter.188 However, with regard to its deferral right under Article 16 of  the Rome 
Statute, the Security Council margin of  discretion is clearly circumscribed.189 As 
179 Security Council ‘Update Report: Kenya and the ICC’ 6 April 2011 (“Council Update Report”).
180 Council Update Report.
181 Council Update Report; See also “Deferral flop … what next?” http://kenyauptodate.blogspot.
com/2011/03/deferral-flopwhat-next.html (reporting that among the permanent members only 
China supported Kenya’s cause).
182 Council Update Report.
183 Council Update Report.
184 S/2011/201 (23 March 2011).
185 Council Update Report.
186 Application on behalf  of  the government of  the Republic of  Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of  the ICC Statute 
(ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11) (31 March 2011).
187 See Pre-trial Chamber II, Decision on the application by the government of  Kenya challenging the 
admissibility of  the case pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of  the Statute ICC-01/09-02/11-96 (30 May 
2011) para. 61; 65.
188 See discussion on “An overview of  the Security Council” above particularly note 17.
189 See discussion on “The deferral provision under Article 16” above. See also Bolton J, ‘The risks and 
weaknesses of  the International Criminal Court from America’s perspective’ 41 Virginia Journal of  
International Law (2000) 186, 198 (pointing out that Article 16 “shifts the balance of  authority from 
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the drafting history shows, this right was not intended as a means by which the 
Security Council can undermine the budding Court.190 Instead it was meant to be 
used sparingly and only in circumstances where ICC investigation or prosecution 
can clearly be shown to threaten the resolution of  a situation predetermined by 
the Council as amounting to threat to peace, breach of  peace or act of  aggres-
sion.191 The practice of  the Security Council shows that threat to peace could 
arise from failure to prosecute international crimes, meaning that any request 
for deferral of  ICC’s mandate under the Rome Statute on the basis of  threat to 
peace must demonstrate that the threat from ICC’s action outweighs the threat 
that would arise from failure to prosecute the said crimes.192 The practice of  
the Council also shows that Article 16 is understood by many states as being 
limited to deferrals of  investigations or prosecutions on a case-by-case basis.193 
The practice further shows that, while political considerations have a bearing,194 
a case is unlikely to pass or be sustained within the Council if  members are not 
convinced that it meets the threshold of  Article 16195 or if  the investigation or 
prosecution was triggered by a referral from the Security Council or by a referral 
from a state.196 Where a case is passed by the Council, the ICC has been given a 
residual right (indeed a duty) under Article 16 to refuse to comply with a Security 
Council resolution that is incompatible with the Article’s tenets.197
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